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Abstract 
"ENUM" is an Internet protocol designed to enable one to be reached on an array of 
different electronic communications devices by means of just one number  a telephone 
number.  ENUM effectively bridges the telephone and Internet worlds by placing 
telephone numbers from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
Recommendation E.164 public telecommunication numbering plan into the Internet 
Domain Name System (DNS) as domain names. 
ENUM potentially presents significant public policy issues at both the domestic and 
international levels.  Ultimately, it should not matter whether ENUM is approached as a 
telecommunications issue or an Internet issue because: (1) they are becoming the same 
thing technically, and (2) they engage the same global public interests.  For the same 
reasons as apply to traditional telecommunications, and even to the Internet itself, public 
oversight of ENUM naming, numbering, and addressing resources is justified both by 
technical necessity and the interests of consumer protection (particularly personal 
privacy) and competition at higher service layers. 
A single, coordinated global DNS domain for at least Tier 0 (the international level) of 
the ENUM names hierarchy should be designated by public authorities.  While the paper 
deals primarily with Tier 0 issues, it canvasses Tier 1 (domestic) issues because of their 
relevance for international Internet Tier 0 policy.  Many of the technical characteristics 
and policy considerations relevant at the ENUM Tier 0 and 1 zones are directly 
applicable to the Internets IP address space and DNS root (or Tier 0) zone. 
Despite the fundamentally international nature of the Internet's logical infrastructure 
layer, and the purported privatization of administration of its IP address space and the 
DNS, Internet governance is not yet truly international.  Despite assurances to the 
international community that it would withdraw from this role, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce has retained significant residual policy authority over  the Internets logical 
infrastructure.  The ENUM policy debate illustrates the need for authoritative 
international public oversight of public communications network logical infrastructure, 
including that of traditional telecommunications, the Internet, and ENUM. 
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Introduction 
ENUM is an umbrella term for a series of technical protocols and institutional 
arrangements which effectively bridge the telephone and Internet worlds.  ENUM is designed to enable 
one to be reached on an array of different electronic communications devices and applications by means 
of just one identifier - a telephone number.  ENUM aims to solve some of the biggest problems in the 
development of Internet Protocol (IP) telephony  namely, different addressing schemes used by public 
switched telephone network (PSTN) and Internet protocol (IP) terminals, and the lack of public 
directories of the latter.  Because of certain design choices in the current proposal for ENUM, it 
potentially presents significant public policy issues, at the domestic and international levels.  This paper 
explores some of these issues and their implications for Internet infrastructure policy.  It argues that, for 
the same reasons as apply to traditional telecommunications, and even the Internet itself, public oversight 
of ENUM naming, numbering, and addressing resources is justified both by technical necessity and the 
interests of consumer protection (particularly personal privacy) and competition at higher service layers.  
A single, coordinated global DNS domain for at least Tier 0 (the international level) of the ENUM names 
hierarchy should thus be designated by public authorities. 
Most public policy issues relating to ENUM implementation arise at its Tier 1 and 2 
(domestic) levels and are thus the domestic concern of individual countries.  In the Internet context, 
however, since its logical infrastructure is inherently global, the kinds of public policy issues which arise 
at ENUM Tiers 0 and 1 arise in the Internets own Tier 0  the DNS root zone and IP address space  two 
essential elements of the Internets logical infrastructure layer.  These issues should be thought of as 
issues of international public policy.  While the Internet supports nearly limitless diversity at its higher 
and lower layers, it demands complete uniqueness of identifiers and absolute adherence to standards and 
protocols at its logical infrastructure layer  if one wants to participate in the global public Internet, that 
is.  The choice to abandon it is always open.  While that route is often pursued for particular reasons (e.g., 
to provide commercial-grade IP telephony), the near-universal interconnectivity and interoperability 
which the global public Internet offers are hard to leave behind.  No one requires the use of particular 
name and number spaces, nor the observance of particular standards and protocols, but choosing not to do 
so means isolation.  The ruthlessly binary nature of computing and computer networking requires strict 
adherence to relatively narrow but incalculably important sets of rules. These rules define the Internet.  
While they are technical in nature, they are economic, social, political, and effectively legal in 
consequence.1 
The field of Internet infrastructure policy is still very young.  The purported privatization 
of the Internets domain name system (DNS) was the first major event in the development of public 
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policy for the Internets logical infrastructure.  The ongoing development of an international public policy 
framework for ENUM may well be the second.  The question of who should hold what authority (if any) 
over which elements of the Internets logical infrastructure is not yet completely settled.  Management 
responsibility and limited administrative authority over some Internet naming, numbering, and addressing 
resources have been delegated (perhaps improperly as a matter of U.S. administrative and/or 
constitutional law  see Section 5(c) below) to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN).  However, despite assurances that it would divest itself of such power, the U.S. government 
continues to hold residual policy authority over these resources.  Considering examples of who holds (or 
is proposed to hold) these three forms of authority (management responsibility, administrative authority, 
and residual policy authority) over telephone, Internet, and ENUM naming, numbering, and addressing 
resources highlights fundamental unresolved international policy issues with respect to the governance of 
the Internets logical infrastructure.  The existing pattern of Internet governance is not the outcome that 
many countries expected from the White Paper process.2  As such, Internet governance is not yet truly 
international. 
Straw-man characterizations of the traditional telecommunications world as state-
dominated and rule-bound, and the Internet world as entrepreneur-dominated and unregulated, are no 
longer true nor helpful.  Both have changed, in part due to the impact of one on the other.  Neither regime 
will prevail completely in technical and policy terms, but rather hybrids will emerge.  The early 
popularity of the Internet is not telecommunications and Internet cannot be regulated memes only 
delayed the difficult process of dealing with public policy issues arising from the convergence of 
traditional telecommunications and the Internet.  The principles which underlie policy in each regime 
need to be examined in an attempt to fashion the right regime for the converged environment, and also for 
new public communications technologies which resemble neither.  To the extent that the dominant trends 
in computer and communications technology appear to be towards unified, global, multiservice 
communications platforms, then the associated public policy regimes should similarly strive for unity, 
both in policy and authority. 
This paper is primarily about ENUM Tier 0 (or international) policy issues.  However, it 
canvasses Tier 1 domestic issues because of their relevance for international Internet Tier 0 policy.  Other 
papers presented on the same conference panel are presumably concerned with technical and policy 
considerations at Tiers 1 and 2 in the U.S. context.3  As a matter of disclosure, my interest in ENUM 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 This insight is masterfully illustrated in L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999), albeit 
with somewhat less recognition of the international scope of these issues than would be expected. 
2 United States Department of Commerce, Management of Internet Names and Addresses (5 June 1998), 
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm> (the White Paper). 
3 J. Hwang et al., Analyzing ENUM Service and Administration from the Bottom Up: The Addressing System for IP Telephony 
and Beyond; R. Cannon, ENUM Public Policy Considerations; M. Weiss & H. Kim, Voice over IP in the Local Exchange: A 
Case Study.  See <http://www.tprc.org/TPRC01/agenda01.htm#enum>. 
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policy is part of a larger academic interest in Internet infrastructure policy, the subject of my doctoral 
research in law.  I am not currently affiliated with any company with a direct interest in ENUM, nor with 
any government, nor the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), although I have worked in its 
General Secretariat before as a consultant on IP telephony policy. 
1. What is ENUM? 
The description of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)4 working group which 
developed the ENUM protocol suite provides a good starting-point for understanding ENUM:5 
This working group will define a DNS-based architecture and protocols for mapping a 
telephone number to a set of attributes (e.g. URLs) which can be used to contact a 
resource associated with that number.  
Background:  
Telephone numbers now identify many different types of end terminals, supporting many 
different services and protocols. Telephone numbers are used to identify ordinary phones, 
fax machines, pagers, data modems, email clients, text terminals for the hearing impaired, 
etc.  
A prospective caller may wish to discover which services and protocols are supported by 
the terminal named by a given telephone number. The caller may also require more 
information than just the telephone number to communicate with the terminal.  
As an example, certain telephones can receive short email messages. The telephone 
number is not enough information to be able to send email; the sender must have more 
information (equivalent to the information in a mailto: URL).  
From the callee's perspective, the owner of the telephone number or device may wish to 
control the information which prospective callers may receive.  
The architecture must allow for different service providers competing openly to furnish 
the directory information required by clients to reach the desired telephone numbers.  
ENUM is an acronym  but for precisely what is unclear.6  In any event, ENUM refers to a series of 
technical protocols and institutional arrangements which effectively bridge the presently functionally 
separate worlds of the telephone and the Internet.  Richard Shockey, co-chair of the IETF ENUM working 
group and Senior Technical Industry Liaison with NeuStar, Inc., describes ENUM this way:7 
ENUM enables calling users or entities to make a selection from the range of services 
that are available, especially over the Internet, for communicating with a particular 
person or entity when the calling user knows only their telephone number. ENUM 
enables users to access Internet based services and resources from Internet aware 
telephones, ordinary telephones connected to Internet gateways or proxy services and 
other Internet connected devices that are limited to numeric keypad data entry, where 
input is limited to numeric digits. ENUM enables users to specify their preferences for 
                                                 
4 <http://www.ietf.org/>.  The IETFs Website describes it as follows: The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is a large 
open international community of network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of the 
Internet architecture and the smooth operation of the Internet. (Overview of the IETF (undated),  
<http://www.ietf.org/overview.html>). 
5 IETF, Charter, Telephone Number Mapping (enum) Working Group (Last Modified: 31-Jul-01), 
<http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/enum-charter.html>. 
6 ENUM has been said to stand for: tElephone NUmber Mapping, Electronic NUMber, E-number, and E.164 NUmber Mapping. 
7 R. Shockey, NeuStar, Inc., Internet-Draft: Frequently Asked Questions About ENUM (26 July 2000), 
<http://www.ngi.org/enum/pub/draft-shockey-enum-faq-01.txt>. 
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receiving incoming communications (eg, specifying a preference for voicemail messages 
over live calls or indicating a destination for call forwarding). ENUM will give much 
improved user control over communications. 
ENUM presents two major service opportunities.  First, it will provide the first 
comprehensive way to call an IP telephony-based terminal device, whether from a PSTN phone or 
another IP phone, regardless of the nature of the underlying long-haul transport network (be it circuit-
switched or packet-switched) in between.8  Second, ENUM provides a way to link (virtually, of course) 
diverse terminal devices so that they can exchange multimedia messages.  Neither ENUM nor its core 
technology, naming authority pointers (NAPTRs),9 route or transport the messages  those functions are 
performed by other protocols and facilities  rather, they identify the available methods for contacting a 
specific node identified by means of a telephone number, and (optionally) the persons order of 
preference among these methods at any given time.  These might include an Internet email box, an IP 
phone on a packet-switched network (possibly the Internet), or a fax machine on a circuit-switched 
network. 
To accomplish this, the ENUM protocol (as set out in the remarkably brief RFC 291610) 
defines a method for converting an ordinary full-length telephone number11 into a DNS name which can 
be interpreted by a distributed system of DNS servers to return one or more uniform resource identifiers 
(URIs) which indicate available communications protocols (and thus devices or applications), the names 
or addresses associated with them, and the persons preference among which at any given time.  The only 
number which the calling party need know is the called partys telephone number  everything else is 
automated by a combination of ENUM and other protocols.  Further details of ENUMs technical 
operation, aside from its use of telephone numbers, are not important for present purposes.12 
The ENUM protocol is an elegantly simple way of converting telephone numbers into 
domain names.  The telephone number is used as a name  not tied to any particular end device or 
location on any particular network  to identify an individual.  In the simplest configuration, a telephone 
number is entered into a software interface on an Internet-connected device (e.g., a PC).  The application 
converts the string of digits into a domain name by reversing the order, separating each digit with a . 
and appending a given second-level domain (SLD) name and a given top-level domain suffix (TLD).  
                                                 
8 For a detailed introduction to the technical, economic, and regulatory issues associated with IP telephony, see International 
Telecommunication Union, ITU Internet Reports: IP Telephony (Geneva: ITU, 2000), of which Chapter 4, Regulatory Aspects 
of IP Telephony, was written by the author while working as a consultant in the ITUs Strategy & Policy Unit (SPU) in 2000. 
9 RFC 2915, M. Mealling, Network Solutions, Inc. and R. Daniel, DATAFUSION Inc., The Naming Authority Pointer 
(NAPTR) DNS Resource Record (September 2000), <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2915.txt>. 
10 RFC 2916, P. Fältström, Cisco Systems Inc., E.164 number and DNS (September 2000), 
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2916.txt>. 
11 Including all country codes (for international calls) and area codes (for calls within North America, for example), but not 
dialing codes, such as the leading 1 used in North America as a flag for switches to identify long distance calls. 
12 Web pages offering comprehensive links to ENUM-related technical and policy material are available at 
<http://www.cybertelecom.org/enum.htm> (Washington Internet Project), 
<http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/infocom/enum/index.html> (ITU), and <http://www.ngi.org/enum/> (Centre for Next Generation 
Internet). 
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Thus the full-length telephone number +1 (703) 845-1010 (the reception desk of the Hilton Hotel at 
Mark Centre, Alexandria, Virginia, USA) becomes 0.1.0.1.5.4.8.3.0.7.1.<sld>.<tld>.  This Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL) is functionally no different from tprc.org  it simply involves more domains to 
the left of the TLD (each dot demarcates a different domain). 
2. E.164 Numbers 
To the extent that ENUM might appear to be merely a new way of using the Internets 
existing DNS, any policy issues relating to it might be assumed to be Internet policy issues.  Indeed, the 
choice of telephone numbers at first appears arbitrary  any string of ASCII13 characters could have been 
used instead, such as a domain name, in which case the policy issues at stake would certainly be limited 
to the Internet (but would be no less international public policy issues).  However, RFC 2916 chooses a 
particular set of characters to use as the initial hook into the ENUM system  E.164 telephone 
numbers.  Patrik Fältströms proposal calls for the transformation of E.164 numbers into DNS names.14  
E.164 refers to the ITUs international public telecommunication numbering plan15 (and other 
associated standards).  The E.164 plan is a kind of master list of telephone numbering plans in use 
around the world (identified by Country Code (CC)) and, consequently, the agencies which have authority 
over them.  Choosing to use telephone numbers as telephone numbers (as distinct from how they might 
be used at, say, a video store for membership indexing) has policy consequences (of which Fältström, a 
Swede, was quite aware). 
Country codes (and other global codes which are not discussed herein) are allocated and 
managed by the Director of the ITU Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) and ITU Member 
States.  The role of the TSB Director and the responsibilities of the ITU Member States with respect to the 
numbering resources in question are defined in a World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly 
(WTSA) resolution titled: Resolution 20  Procedures for allocation and management of international 
numbering resources.16  At the top level, the telephone numbering space is only an administrative 
hierarchy (as opposed to an operational hierarchy like the DNS17).  A CC must, for technical reasons, only 
be used by one country (or other political entity, or group thereof), and within each country, numbers 
falling under each CC must similarly be managed to ensure non-conflicting use.  The countries of the 
                                                 
13 American Standard Code for Information Interchange. 
14 Note 10 above, at 1: Through transformation of E.164 numbers into DNS names and the use of existing DNS services like 
delegation through NS records, and use of NAPTR records in DNS, one can look up what services are available for a specific 
domain name in a decentralized way with distributed management of the different levels in the lookup process. (references 
omitted). 
15 ITU-T Recommendation E.164, The international public telecommunication numbering plan (05/97), 
<http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-t/rec/e/e164.html>. 
16 ITU, World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), Montreal, 2000, Resolution 20 - Procedures for 
allocation and management of international numbering resources, <http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-t/wtsa-res/res20.html>. 
17 While the political motivation for the document is plain, A.M. Rutkowskis Internet-draft, Development and Basis of 
International Telephone Numbering (21 March 2001), <http://www1.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rutkowski-enum-basis-00.txt> 
provides a detailed history of the E.164 plan and its predecessors. 
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world have agreed that the top level zones of international telecommunications numbering resources 
should be neutrally and transparently managed by the TSB.  However, control over each countrys 
assigned E.164 resources lies entirely within that country by the associated sovereign. 
3. Zones of Authority 
The Internet DNS is a system of hierarchical, distributed databases.  Authoritative lists of 
names within each domain must be maintained to prevent conflicting use, and thus to ensure the integrity 
of the DNS as a whole.  In the example of tprc.org, three such lists are implied, from right to left: that 
of what TLDs are in the root zone (the suppressed trailing dot after org18), what SLDs are in the org 
TLD, and what hosts are in the tprc SLD.  Many lists like these make up the DNS databases.  The DNS 
protocol mechanisms effect the mapping of domain names into Internet IP addresses, which identify 
individual Internet-host interfaces.19  These lists are kept on name servers in the form of zones  particular 
sections of the overall DNS tree.20 
Much of the day-to-day work of ICANN since its creation has consisted of formalizing 
the legal framework governing the registries and registrars of domains and domain names in this tree.  As 
explained in Section 5(c) below, ICANN has been given limited administrative authority over the DNS.  
Management responsibility lies with various registrars (e.g., the registrar of .com is VeriSign Global 
Registry Solutions, a subsidiary of VeriSign, Inc., which also owns Network Solutions, Inc.  the original 
.com registrar) while residual policy authority rests with the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC).  
Transforming E.164 telephone numbers into domain names implies the identification of who holds 
management responsibility, administrative authority, and residual policy authority over each domain in an 
ENUM name such as 0.1.0.1.5.4.8.3.0.7.1.<sld>.<tld>. 
Similarly, the fundamental question in Internet governance is that of who should hold 
what authority or responsibility (if any) over the suppressed dot at the far right of every Internet domain 
name and email address (the root of the Internet naming tree) and the IP address space to which DNS 
protocols map domain names and email addresses.  These resources are referred to in this paper as Tier 
                                                 
18 RFC 1034, P. Mockapetris, ISI, Domain Names  Concepts and Facilities (November 1987), 
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt> at Section 3.1. 
19 Internet traffic is routed by reference to IP addresses, not domain names. The meanings of these terms are explained in H. 
Rood, Whats in a name, whats in a number: some characteristics of identifiers on electronic networks (2000) 24 
Telecommunications Policy 533 at 538: A name identifies a person, a device, an organisation, a role or a place; [a]n address 
identifies a location of a device on an electronic network; and [a] route identifies a path to reach a certain address.  
20 Note 18 above, at Section 2.4: NAME SERVERS are server programs which hold information about the domain tree's 
structure and set information.  A name server may cache structure or set information about any part of the domain tree, but in 
general a particular name server has complete information about a subset of the domain space, and pointers to other name servers 
that can be used to lead to information from any part of the domain tree.  Name servers know the parts of the domain tree for 
which they have complete information; a name server is said to be an AUTHORITY for these parts of the name space.  
Authoritative information is organized into units called ZONEs, and these zones can be automatically distributed to the name 
servers which provide redundant service for the data in a zone. 
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0 of the Internets naming, numbering, and addressing spaces.  The concept of tiers is key to 
understanding ENUM, as explained below. 
4. Should There Be a Single, Coordinated Global DNS Domain for ENUM? 
(a) Designated or multiple zones at Tier 0? 
While authority over each domain in the ENUM name 0.1.0.1.5.4.8.3.0.7.1.<sld>.<tld> 
must be analyzed separately, the domains naturally group into tiers, making the analytical process 
simpler.  While the concept of tiers does not appear in RFC 2916, it is nearly-universally used in ENUM 
discourse.  ENUM Tier 0 consists of the <sld>.<tld> combination in the above example, that is, the 
authoritative list of international CC zones in the global ENUM namespace.  CCs comprise the first one 
to three digits to the left of <sld>.  In the example, +1 is the CC, and with the Tier 0 information 
added, becomes 1.<sld>.<tld>  Tier 1 in the ENUM schema.  Of course, +1 is a special case 
because it is shared by a group of countries in North America and the Caribbean.21  Replacing +1 with 
+678 (Vanuatu), and taking into account the structure of the national numbering plan within +678, 
the example becomes: 9.4.7.6.3.8.7.6.<sld>.<tld> (the fax machine at the Hotel Santo in Luganville, 
Espiritu Santo Island, Vanuatu).  In this case, 8.7.6.<sld>.<tld> is a single Tier 1 zone.  Tier 2 refers 
to the full-length ENUM domain name, which mirrors the full-length E.164 number, but in reverse, with 
the + stripped off, with dots separating the digits, and the SLD and TLD tacked on the end  that is, 
9.4.7.6.3.8.7.6.<sld>.<tld>. 
The initial question in the ENUM policy debate (and the focus of the first half of this 
paper) is whether there should be only one Tier 0 list of Tier 1 zones and authoritative name servers for 
each CC zone.  If Tier 0 is so designated, then the decision of which TLD is to be used to house ENUM 
names must be made.22  Alternatively, if Tier 0 is not designated, then there may presumably be multiple 
lists (which can technically be placed under any <sld>.<tld> combination) serving the same function.  
VeriSign, Inc. and its representatives have from time to time stated that it considers itself at liberty to set 
up an ENUM name space under the TLD and SLD of its choosing and start offering Tier 2 services (that 
is, the actual conversion of E.164 phone numbers into Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)).  This, more 
than anything else, has gotten the attention of the ITU-T and national numbering plan administrators 
because it raises the possibility that telephone number allocations in the ENUM name space might 
diverge from those in the official E.164 numbering plan space.  Their concerns are summarized in the 
                                                 
21 The North American Numbering Council (NANC) administers +1 under the North American Numbering Plan (NANP), 
<http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/Nanc/>. Technical management is performed by the North American Numbering Plan Administrator 
(NANPA) (currently NeuStar, Inc.).  Special arrangements will have to be made among the countries within World Zone 1 
regarding Tier 1.  Within +1, numbering plan areas (NPAs) are assigned to specific areas (including provinces, states, cities, 
and countries) within the larger area.  Within World Zone 1, it may be useful to think of the top-level zone as Tier 1a, while a 
group of NPAs relating to a particular country might be referred to as Tier 1b, and specific NPAs within each country as Tier 
1c.  For the sake of simplicity, these divisions are not used in this paper. 
22 Due to space constraints, this issue is not addressed in detail in this paper, but see Section 4(e) below. 
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following passage from the Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications (ART), the numbering plan 
authority in France:23 
Primarily, ENUM raises the question of the coherence between E.164 telephone numbers 
and domain names. If the general public is to use services made possible by ENUM, it 
appears that perfect coherence will have to be guaranteed in order to protect the main 
advantage of E.164 numbering, which is the use of a system already widely used and 
accepted by the public. 
Special attention should be paid to this question, for the following reasons: 
• Management of ENUM domain names which is not coordinated with that of 
E.164 numbers could result in the creation of ENUM subdomains which do not 
correspond to the country codes assigned by the ITU.  
• Similarly, management of ENUM domain names which is not coordinated with 
that of E.164 numbers could result in the assignment of ENUM domain names 
which do not respect the numbering plan matching a given country code.  
• Finally, poor correspondence between the assigned ENUM domain names and 
E.164 numbers could cause incoherence between the recipient of a telephone 
number and the recipient of the corresponding ENUM domain name. 
Maintaining perfect coherence between E.164 numbers and their equivalent ENUM names implies that 
there be only one official ENUM name space  often called the Golden Tree.  Apart from the policy 
reasons noted by ART, others of which are discussed below, there are simple technical reasons why this is 
not only desirable, but necessary. 
(b) The technical necessity of uniqueness 
One of the most controversial issues in Internet governance is, surprisingly, the question 
of whether perfect coherence is required in the Internets naming, numbering, and addressing spaces.  
That the controversy persists is somewhat odd, given the preponderance of technical opinion that such 
uniqueness is absolutely essential  a sine qua non of public internetworking.  Indeed, the exact same 
considerations apply to all three of telephone networks, the Internet, and ENUM.  With respect to the 
Internet, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB)24 explains:25 
To remain a global network, the Internet requires the existence of a globally unique 
public name space.  The DNS name space is a hierarchical name space derived from a 
single, globally unique root. This is a technical constraint inherent in the design of the 
DNS. Therefore it is not technically feasible for there to be more than one root in the 
public DNS.  That one root must be supported by a set of coordinated root servers 
administered by a unique naming authority. 
                                                 
23 France, Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications (ART), The principles and conditions of implementation of the 
ENUM protocol in France  Public consultation: 23 May 2001  12 June 2001 (English version), <http://www.art-
telecom.fr/publications/cp-enum-gb.htm>. 
24 <http://www.iab.org/iab/>.  Its Website describes it as follows: The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) is a technical advisory 
group of the Internet Society. (IAB Overview (3 November 2000), <http://www.iab.org/iab/overview.html>).  The Internet 
Society (ISOC) (<http://www.isoc.org/>) describes itself as a professional membership society with more than 150 
organizational and 6,000 individual members in over 100 countries. It provides leadership in addressing issues that confront the 
future of the Internet, and is the organization home for the groups responsible for Internet infrastructure standards, including the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Internet Architecture Board (IAB).. 
25 RFC 2826, Internet Architecture Board, IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root (May 2000), 
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2826.txt> at 1. 
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Put simply, deploying multiple public DNS roots would raise a very strong possibility 
that users of different ISPs who click on the same link on a web page could end up at 
different destinations, against the will of the web page designers. 
This does not preclude private networks from operating their own private name spaces, 
but if they wish to make use of names uniquely defined for the global Internet, they have 
to fetch that information from the global DNS naming hierarchy, and in particular from 
the coordinated root servers of the global DNS naming hierarchy. 
Since ENUM is a DNS-based system, the exact same considerations apply.  As identified by ART, one 
risk inherent in multiple Tier 0 lists (and associated databases and servers) is that one number may be 
assigned to different people in the E.164 hierarchy and the ENUM hierarchy, whether accidentally or 
intentionally.  The importance of coherence in the assignment of domain names is also well explained by 
Stuart Lynn, President of ICANN:26 
The DNS is a globally distributed database of domain name (and other) information. One 
of its core design goals is that it reliably provides the same answers to the same queries 
from any source on the public Internet, thereby supporting predictable routing of Internet 
communications. Achievement of that design goal requires a globally unique public name 
space derived from a single, globally unique DNS root. 
Uniqueness is also required in Internet IP addressing and telephone network numbering for the exact 
same reasons.27 
(c) What about unofficial ENUM name spaces? 
The technical necessity of a single, authoritative top-level ENUM root zone may be one 
thing, but saying that there can be only one such zone (and thus name space) is another.  VeriSigns Vice-
President of Internet Strategy, Anthony Rutkowski, asserts that multiple ENUM roots should not only be 
permitted, but that they may be the only possible way to implement ENUM at the global level.28  
VeriSigns proposal for the ENUM name space appears to be that competing firms would populate and 
maintain their own Tiers 0, 1 and 2 databases by entering into commercial agreements with all necessary 
parties.  The possibility that a private firm might proceed with such a plan (even if just as a trial) before 
an official Tier 0 regime can be designated through ITU-T presents the question of what public 
authorities could do about such unofficial implementations, if they did become widely used. 
First, it is worth bearing in mind these further comments by ICANN President Stuart 
Lynn, with reference to the Internet name space more generally:29 
[ICANN's mandate to preserve stability of the DNS does not preclude] experimentation 
done in a manner that does not threaten the stability of name resolution in the 
authoritative DNS. Responsible experimentation is essential to the vitality of the Internet. 
                                                 
26 S. Lynn, President, ICANN, ICP-3: A Unique, Authoritative Root for the DNS (9 July 2001), <http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-
3.htm>. 
27 See A. Andeen & J.L. King, Addressing and the Future of Communications Competition: Lessons from Telephony and the 
Internet, in B. Kahin & J.H. Keller, eds., Coordinating the Internet (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) 208. 
28 See, for example, A. Rutkowski, the ENUM golden tree: the quest for a universal communications identifier (2001) 3 info 
97, <http://www.ngi.org/enum/pub/info_rutkowski.pdf>. 
29 Note 26 above. 
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Nor does it preclude the ultimate introduction of new architectures that may ultimately 
obviate the need for a unique, authoritative root. But the translation of experiments into 
production and the introduction of new architectures require community-based 
approaches, and are not compatible with individual efforts to gain proprietary advantage. 
Quite apart from the question of the authority of ICANN to prohibit alternate DNS roots, or that of the 
ITU to prohibit alternate ENUM roots (which neither likely have on their own), is the practical question 
of whether alternate roots would be likely to succeed against official30 roots at all.  For the same reason 
that a single authoritative root is necessary from a technical standpoint, it is also preferable from a 
business standpoint for users of all kinds who rely on the stability of the DNS for their own purposes (as 
opposed to firms wanting to enter the name and number assignment business).  Firms of the former type 
will naturally prefer the lists that everyone uses.  Jonathan Weinberg explains that the DNS root which 
ICANN now administers is considered the public Internet root today, even though alternative roots have 
been available for years for those who wish to refer to them:31 
Very few Internet users  look to alternative root servers. The vast majority rely on the 
single set of authoritative root servers, historically supervised by Jon Postel, that have 
achieved canonical status. 
Indeed, Rutkowski himself believes that it would probably not be necessary to prohibit alternative ENUM 
roots because the official one(s) would trump them in any case:32 
The Followers [his term of derision for proponents of the single, authoritative root model] 
 while casually suggesting that others can offer competitive ENUM services outside the 
Golden Tree  know full well that the existence of a government-designated zone will 
significantly harm, if not exclude competitors from the marketplace. 
This is somewhat surprising to read, given both Rutkowskis otherwise resolute faith in the superiority of 
marketplace solutions at all tiers and the fact that his company has recently been forced to abandon its 
historical claims to anti-trust immunity relating to its activities under the Cooperative Agreement between 
it and the DoC.33  Being government-designated, both the root server and the gTLD registries managed by 
VeriSign subsidiary NSI would presumably have the same negative consequences on the prospects for 
competition in, at least, the gTLD name space  perhaps partially explaining why VeriSign thought 
US$21 billion a fair price for NSI in March 2000.34 
                                                 
30 It is worth noting that the administrators of the many networks which make up the public Internet are not under any legal 
obligation to point their name servers to the root servers administered by ICANN, thus alternative (or unofficial) systems are at 
least legally possible. 
31 J. Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy (2000) 50 Duke L.J. 187, 
<http://www.law.wayne.edu/weinberg/legitimacy.PDF> at 198. 
32 Note 28 above, at 99. 
33 See note 97 below. 
34 VeriSign Nabs NetSol for $21 Bil Wired News (7 March 2000), 
<http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,34784,00.html>. 
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In Rutkowskis view, the question of unofficial ENUM name spaces should be 
understood in anti-trust (or competition law) terms.  A sense of resignation to the inevitability of a 
designated Tier 0 is evident in the following statement:35 
This is an informational Internet Draft containing a proposed technical and administrative 
framework and elements for ENUM neutrality among implementations. 
Such a framework is important to assure that if some special public governmental or 
intergovernmental arrangements are sought for particular ENUM offerings in the 
marketplace, such actions: 1) avoid prejudice to commercial ENUM offerings employing 
other element options, and 2) provide for fair and non-discriminatory access by other 
commercial competitive ENUM providers to publicly supported administrative and 
information resources. 
Here Rutkowski appears to argue (on behalf of VeriSign, Inc.), that if a single authoritative ENUM root is 
designated, then despite there being only one registry and registrar at the Tier 0 (and presumably Tier 1) 
levels, other firms should have a right of access to the underlying data which they would need to 
construct their own databases at those layers. 
This argument acknowledges that operating a competitive ENUM system is not as simple 
as simply replicating existing E.164 numbers in a given DNS domain.  While it is certainly feasible, 
assuming that one could access comprehensive, up-to-date information on E.164 telephone number 
assignments all over the world (or some sub-set thereof), the difficulty would be keeping that information 
up-to-date and validating the identity and authority of new and existing customers to add or change 
information in the system.  Other changes, such as area code overlays and splits, could also threaten the 
integrity of a competing ENUM Tier 0 and 1 registry if its operator does not have real-time access to 
updated information.  However, if a particular national numbering plan authority intends that there be 
only one authoritative Tier 1 list (and associated database and server system) applicable to a countrys 
telephone numbers, then it could starve would-be alternative operators by not making such data 
available.  Would such a policy be anti-competitive (under North American competition law principles, 
for the sake of illustration), as Rutkowski argues?36 
First is the elementary point that competition laws do not apply to governments acting as 
governments (as opposed to as a firm in a market).  If it did, then government monopolies over the 
printing of money, collection of taxes, and operation of courts could similarly be branded anti-
competitive.  In countries in which the rule of law is a fundamental constitutional principle, 
governments enjoy wide latitude to do what they consider right, within certain limits.  Competition law is 
not, however, a source of such limits. 
                                                 
35 A.M. Rutkowski, VeriSign, Inc., Framework for ENUM Neutrality (29 August 2001), <http://www.ngi.org/enum/pub/draft-
rutkowski-enum-neutrality-00.txt>. 
36 Note 28 above, at 99: There are major anti-competitive implications of the Golden Tree. 
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Second, the rationale underlying telephone number administration in competitive markets 
illustrates why designating a Tier 1 list would be explicitly pro-competitive  that is, in the interests of 
competition at higher service layers.  Control over numbering resources used in public networks (that is, 
outside of private dialling plans or internal networks) is widely recognized as a potential source of anti-
competitive activity in higher-layer service markets, particularly where one firm holds a dominant 
position in one or more of them.                                                                                                                                                 
Even New Zealand, renowned for its hands-off telecommunications regulatory regime, 
has mandated a neutral industry-based means of administering telephone numbers, in the interest of 
competition itself.37  While administrative authority is exercised through the industry group, residual 
policy authority is held by the government.  The same type of regime prevails in Canada, where the 
Canadian Numbering Administration Consortium Inc. (CNAC) (holder of administrative authority) 
engages the Canadian Numbering Administrator (CNA)38 to perform technical management functions at 
its direction.  CNAC is ultimately subject to the residual policy authority of the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).39  It is likely that many countries with pro-
competitive telecommunications regulatory regimes will consider imposing a similar structure at ENUM 
Tier 1, in the interests of both competition at Tier 2 and subscriber privacy.  Implicit in this approach, 
however, is the assertion that ENUM concerns telecommunications, and is not simply an Internet 
directory service.  The next section addresses this important interpretive issue. 
(d) Is ENUM a telecommunications policy issue or an Internet policy issue? 
Another of Rutkowskis arguments against a single, designated ENUM root zone is that 
ENUM has nothing to do with the international public telecommunications numbering plan, but rather is 
                                                 
37 See New Zealand, Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications, Final Report (27 September 2000), 
<http://www.med.govt.nz/teleinquiry/reports/final/final-07.html#P1020_190362> at section 7.4.  The New Zealand government 
is in the process of introducing new telecommunications legislation based on the following premises (which are rather different 
from those underlying the previous competition-law-only regime, which is widely thought to have been an abject failure): 1. 
There should be a single regulatory framework covering all electronic communications services.  2. The existing regulatory 
regime is not best suited to achieving the Government's objective for electronic communications. To meet the objective, light-
handed industry specific regulation (the Electronic Communications Act) is required. (at Recommendations). 
38 Currently SAIC Canada.  See <http://www.cnac.ca/>. 
39 Further, access to subscriber listing information, which is likely what Rutkowski means by publicly supported administrative 
and information resources is often regulated, primarily to protect subscriber privacy.  In Canada, for instance, directory data is 
made conditionally available monthly by law to independent telephone directory publishers (Telecom Decision CRTC 95-3, 
Provision of Directory Database Information and Real-Time Access to Directory Assistance Databases (8 March 1995), 
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/eng/Decisions/1995/DT95-3.htm>, as amended by Order-in-Council P.C. 1996-1001 (25 June 
1996), while real-time data (which ENUM services would almost certainly require) is only made conditionally available on 
condition that it be used solely for the purpose of providing directory assistance (Telecom Decision CRTC 97-8, Local 
Competition (1 May 1997), <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/eng/Decisions/1997/DT97-8.htm> at para. 233).  ENUM services 
would likely not be considered directory assistance because, as that term is ordinarily understood in North America, it implies 
that the requester does not know the phone number of the person he or she wants to reach.  ENUM, in contrast, is based on the 
use of known phone numbers.  ENUM service providers would thus probably have a legal right of access to neither monthly or 
real-time subscriber listing information. 
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merely an Internet-based directory service.  Following his comment that designating official ENUM 
zones is anti-competitive, Rutkowski continues:40 
What tend to get swept under the carpet are fundamental issues like whether a co-
ordinated government movement should meddle in a nascent market, based on some new 
internet protocol.  Just because this is an internet directory service based on telephone 
numbers doesnt seem a good enough reason. 
While he has puzzlingly contradicted this sentiment elsewhere by saying that ENUM is not a directory 
service,41 his argument appears to be that an Internet directory service (even if based on telephone 
numbers) is beyond the competence of telecommunications regulatory authorities.  However, his 
concomitant recognition that ENUM is based on telephone numbers is telling. 
As explained above, the choice to use E.164 telephone numbers for ENUM was anything 
but arbitrary.  While it is often forgotten, the original motivation for ENUM (and other such efforts) was 
primarily to find a way to enable PSTN subscribers to dial an IP phone  currently only the opposite is 
possible outside of private network environments.  The other options, such as IP addresses, cannot easily 
be dialed on a standard telephone, and even if they could, mass market acceptance might be hard to come 
by.  Telephone numbers, on the other hand, are familiar, easy to remember, easy to dial, and associated 
with a system thought to be stable, reliable, and relatively secure  the telephone system.  Having made 
the decision to use E.164 resources, the Internet community (with which VeriSign currently appears to be 
at odds, as has often been the case in the past) must be prepared to abide by the rules applicable to 
telephone numbers, at the domestic and international levels.  Indeed, in RFC 2916, Fältström explicitly 
recognizes this: 
Names within this [ENUM top-level] zone are to be delegated to parties according to the 
ITU recommendation E.164.  The names allocated should be hierarchic in accordance 
with ITU Recommendation E.164, and the codes should assigned in accordance with that 
Recommendation. 
Not only is there consensus within the Internet technical community on both the technical and policy 
necessity of a single, coordinated ENUM Tier 0, but the relevant government agencies in Sweden,42 the 
United Kingdom,43 and France44 have expressed initial support for the Golden Tree model.  Even the 
industry advisory group studying the issue in the U.S. has recommended that: [t]he US should participate 
in a global implementation of ENUM rooted in e164.arpa per RFC 2916.45  However, the choice of 
                                                 
40 Note 28 above, at 99-100. 
41 In A.M. Rutkowski, ENUM  networkings new glueball infrastructure, presented at 3rd European ISP Forum, Rome, Italy 
(2-5 October 2000), <http://www.ngi.org/enum/pub/enum_presentation.zip>, Rutkowski asserts that ENUM is: Not a directory 
service, but a core infrastructure for interoperating with all other network infrastructure (at slide 4) (emphasis in original). 
42 Sweden, Post & Telestryrelsen, ENUM - functions that maps telephone numbers to Internet based addresses - a description 
and the possible introduction to Sweden (23 March 2001), <http://www.enum.org/information/files/enum_summary.pdf> 
43 United Kingdom, Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Communications and Information Industries Directorate, DTI 
ENUM Workshop 5 June 2001-06-06: Summary, <http://www.dti.gov.uk/cii/regulatory/enum/>. 
44 See note 23 above. 
45 Report of the Department of State ITAC-T Advisory Committee Study Group A Ad Hoc on ENUM (6 July 2001), 
<http://www.nominum.com/ENUM/2001_07_06-ENUM-Report-Department-of-State-Final.html> at section 8.2. 
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which TLD (.arpa or otherwise) ENUM should be rooted in remains unresolved.  Following on its heels 
is the daunting task of sorting out who should hold what authority over the many Tier 1 and 2 zones in the 
global ENUM system.  The contentious TLD issue is renewing interest among countries in the question of 
control over the Internets Tier 0 zones themselves. 
(e) Which TLD? 
A complex series of steps has been taken by the IAB to put itself in control of 
e164.arpa,46 so that it can negotiate with ITU-T over administrative authority and management 
responsibilities for ENUM Tier 0.  The details of this negotiation, which continue at time of writing, are, 
due to space constraints, beyond the scope of this paper.  The current IAB proposal, however, appears to 
be that it would hold administrative authority for e164.arpa, while RIPE NCC,47 which is also the 
Regional Internet Registry (RIR) for IP addresses in Europe, would have management responsibility for 
e164.arpa, under the IABs direction.  The IABs explanation for the choice of .arpa as the ENUM 
TLD is that it is the one existing Internet TLD which serves an explicit infrastructure function, and is 
hardened with the kind of security and reliability features that an infrastructure domain like ENUMs 
will need48  a claim that arguably does not bear much scrutiny.49  Whether ITU-T50 Study Group 2 
(SG2)51 will endorse this model remains to be seen, but not surprisingly there has already been rejection 
by several ITU Member States of the idea that the IAB or ICANN should have any administrative control 
over ENUM Tier 0. 
In August 2001, as another SG2 meeting approached, John Klensin wrote a liaison 
document from the IAB, on behalf of the IETF, to SG2.52  A sense of exasperation with the slow pace of 
defining initial operational procedures, and with the dismaying prospect of unofficial ENUM roots 
                                                 
46 See Chairmans Report of the ITU ENUM Workshop, ITU, Geneva - 17 January 2001, 
<http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/infocom/enum/workshopjan01/report-jan17-2001.html>,  Annex 7: ENUM Issues, 
<http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/infocom/enum/workshopjan01/annex8-responsibilitiesfore164arpa.html>. 
47 Réseaux IP Européens (RIPE) Network Coordination Centre (NCC), <http://www.ripe.net/ripencc/index.html>. 
48 See John Klensin, for the IAB, IAB Statement on Infrastructure Domain and Subdomains (undated), 
<http://www.iab.org/iab/DOCUMENTS/iab-arpa-stmt.txt>. 
49 For example, .arpa contravenes the IETFs best current practice recommendation that the DNS root servers not provide 
services other than root name service (RFC 2870, R. Bush, et al., Root Name Server Operational Requirements (June 2000), 
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2870.txt>), and the .arpa name servers are not nearly as globally distributed as they would need to 
be to carry out a global infrastructure function (see R. Shaw, ITU, Global ENUM Implementation presented at DTI ENUM 
Workshop, London, England (5 June 2001), <http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/infocom/enum/dtijune501/dti-june-5-2001-1.PPT> at 
slide 15 (showing that 8 of 9 are physically located within the U.S., the 9th in Stockholm, Sweden). 
50 <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/info/itu-t/index.html>.  ITU-T describes itself as follows: The ITU-T mission is to ensure an 
efficient and on-time production of high quality standards covering all fields of telecommunications except radio aspects.  
Standardization work is carried out by 14 study groups in which representatives of the ITU-T membership develop 
Recommendations for the various fields of international telecommunications on the basis of the study of Questions (i.e. areas for 
study). (About ITU-T (undated), <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/info/itu-t/about.html>). 
51 <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com02/index.html>.  SG2 focuses on operational aspects of telecommunications 
service provision, networks, and performance, including naming, numbering, and addressing requirements and resource 
assignment. (About ITU-T, ibid.) 
52 Internet Architecture Board (IAB) on behalf of the IETF, Reflections on risks of, and barriers to, ENUM deployment 
(August 2001), <http://www.iab.org/iab/DOCUMENTS/iab-sg2-liaison-3.txt>. 
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being launched, is evident in the tone of the document.  Klensin affirms the IAB and IETFs commitment 
to ITU authority over the E.164 numbers which are placed into the DNS:53 
As with the E.164 system itself (and the DNS more broadly), if users are to have 
confidence that a particular number will reach the intended party or resource, 
independent of who is asking the question or where they are asking from, it is necessary 
to have only one way to access and interpret that number.  [] 
While there have been a number of proposals for independent schemes with no central 
authority or coordination, those schemes either deny the obvious linkage between ENUM 
identifiers and E.164 numbers (claiming that the former just "look like" telephone 
numbers and are easy to remember, but that they are completely independent and no one 
will confuse the two) or assume a different structure in the Domain Name System than it 
actually uses, based on coordinated national databases, and that would add little or no 
value for the user of the anticipated services. 
Behind the issue of whether the IAB or ICANN should have any control over Tier 0 is the reality that 
.arpa, like all other public Internet TLDs, is subject to the residual control of the U.S. government.  
Klensin explains the history:54 
The current relationship with the US Government is much the same [as during the 
ARPANET period]: the registry for the domain is the IANA, operating under IAB 
supervision.  The Defense Department has formally relinquished any claims on it that 
they might have had (and that few, even on their staff, believed that they did have).  And 
the domain itself has the same relationship with the US Department of Commerce that 
any other TLD, including country code TLDs and TLDs which are not country-specific 
such as .INT, has: in principle, the US Government could order the root operator to make 
changes against the will of the users of that domain. 
In the hope of avoiding future confusion and to further identify the infrastructure purpose 
of the domain, we have begun to identify the domain name as an acronym for "Address 
and Routing Parameter Area".  Of course, this does not change any of the underlying 
relationships, which are described above. 
We will return to this key issue after a brief note regarding instant messaging names and databases. 
(f) AOL Instant Messenger Names and Presence Database 
It is worth noting briefly that even within the information services realm, regulatory 
action is sometimes necessary to address potential anti-competitive behaviour relating to identifiers.  In 
the decision following its review of the AOL/Time Warner merger, the U.S. Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), in a classic telecommunications policy analysis, found as follows:55 
We conclude the market in text-based instant messaging is characterized by strong 
"network effects," i.e., a service's value increases substantially with the addition of new 
users with whom other users can communicate, and that AOL, by any measure described 
in the record, is the dominant IM provider in America. We further find AOL has 
consistently resisted interoperability with other non-licensed IM providers. AOL's market 
dominance in text-based messaging, coupled with the network effects and its resistance to 
interoperability, establishes a very high barrier to entry for competitors that contravenes 
                                                 
53 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
54 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
55 United States, Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of 
Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner Inc., 
Transferee (22 January 2001), <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Orders/2001/fcc01012.txt> at para. 59 (emphasis added). 
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the public interest in open and interoperable communications systems, the development 
of the Internet, consumer choice, competition and innovation. We also find that a Names 
and Presence Database ("NPD") is currently an essential input for the development and 
deployment of many, if not most, future high-speed Internet-based services that rely on 
real-time delivery and interaction. 
The Commission later elaborates that [t]he NPD is more than simply a customer list.  It is a working part 
of an electronic communications network for persons who have requested participation in the network and 
actually use it to exchange communications in real time with other users.56  To ensure that the public 
interest in the U.S. is served by interoperability among NPD-based services, the FCC imposed a condition 
on future versions of AOLs IM service which relate directly to the NPD:57 
AOL Time Warner may not offer an AIHS [Advanced IM-based High-Speed Service] 
application that includes the transmission and reception, utilizing an NPD over the 
Internet Protocol path of AOL Time Warner broadband facilities, of one- or two-way 
streaming video communication using NPD protocols including live images or tape that 
are new features, functions, and enhancements beyond those offered in current offerings 
such as AIM 4.3 or ICQ 2000b, unless and until AOL Time Warner has successfully 
demonstrated it has complied with one of the following grounds for relief.58 
The FCCs regulatory treatment of AOLs Names and Presence Database demonstrates that even apart 
from traditional telecommunications numbering authority, regulators may find reason to impose rules on 
public communications networks when the public interest requires it. 
5. What Do ENUM Policy Issues Tell Us About Internet Policy Issues? 
(a) The unavoidable need for uniqueness and authority 
The technical reasons for a single, coordinated global ENUM DNS domain are equally 
applicable to the DNS itself.  While there has always been a certain amount of minority opinion about this 
in the Internet community,59 the discussions of the technical requirements of ENUM above demonstrate 
the parallel necessity for uniqueness throughout the DNS and IP address spaces.  Even David Post, whose 
                                                 
56 Ibid., at para. 68. 
57 Ibid., at para. 121. 
58 The three options are: Option One.  AOL Time Warner may file a petition demonstrating that it has implemented a standard 
for server-to-server interoperability of NPD-based services that has been promulgated by the IETF or a widely recognized 
standard-setting body that is recognized as complying with National Institute of Standards and Technology or International 
Organization for Standardization requirements for a standard setting body.  Option Two.  AOL may file a petition 
demonstrating that it has entered into written contracts providing for server-to-server interoperability with significant, 
unaffiliated, actual or potential competing providers of NPD-based services offered to the public.  Option Three.  AOL Time 
Warner may seek relief from the condition on offering AIHS video services by filing a petition demonstrating that imposition of 
the condition no longer serves the public interest, convenience and necessity because there has been a material change in 
circumstance, including new evidence that renders the condition on offering AIHS video services no longer necessary in the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity. Ibid., at paras. 122, 123, and 125, respectively. 
59 For a recent argument along these lines, see New.Net, A Proposal to Introduce Market-Based Principles into Domain Name 
Governance (31 May 2001), <http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3-background/new.net-paper-31may01.pdf> and the following 
responses: ICANN, Keeping the Internet a Reliable Global Public Resource: Response to New.net "Policy Paper" (9 July 
2001), <http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3-background/response-to-new.net-09jul01.htm>, and K. Crispin, Internet-draft: Alt-
Roots, Alt-TLDs (May 2001), <http://www.icann.org/stockholm/draft-crispin-alt-roots-tlds-00.txt>. 
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early writing enthusiastically embraced forms of Internet coordination other than top-down authority,60 
subsequently acknowledged this fact with respect to the DNS:61 
bizarre as it may seem at first glance, the root server, and the various domain servers to 
which it points, constitute the very heart of the Internet, the Archimedean point on which 
this vast global network balances. 
The need for coordination, in the interests of all network participants, is now rarely disputed.  Indeed, 
these principles apply to any electronic communications network, as Andeen & King explain:62 
Ultimately, the fundamental technical driver of addressing is that Top Level Domains of 
any addressing scheme must be under the authority of a single, superordinate power if the 
network is to be globally effective.  There is no way to avoid this. 
What that authority might look like, and who should hold it, of course, are separate issues.  We will return 
to them after considering some of the policy reasons for such authority in the context of all three of 
traditional telecommunications, the Internet, and ENUM. 
(b) ENUM Tiers 0 and 1 issues parallel Internet Tier 0 (root zone) issues 
The technical and policy issues which arise at ENUM Tiers 0 and 1 have direct parallels 
in the Internet IP address and DNS Tier 0 zones.  There are at least three groups of reasons why Tier 0-
like  resources are often subject to public oversight.  The first is consumer protection.  Preservation of 
personal privacy, security of communications, and prevention of identity theft are but a few key 
consumer protection concerns which governments around the world must address (whether by legislation 
or supervised self-regulation63).  These considerations are perhaps even more applicable to ENUM 
because it aims to enable users to be reached on a number of different devices by means of just one 
number.64  In many countries, there are also rules preventing the unauthorized switching of consumers 
telephone services from one firm to another (slamming) and the practice of charging customers for 
services which they have not ordered (cramming). 
Law enforcement is a second area.  American telecommunications carriers, for example, 
are required to be able to provide access not only to traditional telecommunications traffic, but packet-
mode communications as well, under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
                                                 
60 See, for example, D.R. Johnson & D.G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of 
Decentralized, Emergent Law, in B. Kahin & J.H. Keller, eds., Coordinating the Internet (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) 
62. 
61 D. Post, Governing Cyberspace: Where is James Madison when you need him? (6 June 1999), 
<http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/governing_cyberspace.htm>.   
62 Note 27 above, at 251. 
63 M. Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-regulation (1997-98) 29 Ottawa L. Rev. 233. 
64 See J. Shiver, Jr., Single-Number Plan Raises Privacy Fears Los Angeles Times (2 September 2001), 
<http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-000071061sep02.story>. 
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(CALEA).65  Any ENUM implementation in the U.S., for example, would almost certainly have to 
comply with these and other law enforcement-related requirements. 
Third, to the extent that market competition is often the best guarantor of the public 
interest (particularly in areas such as price and service quality), it is important to recall that authoritative 
control of numbering resources is widely believed to be a sine qua non of telecommunications 
competition.  This is not merely a transitional issue, either.  It is one of the crucial tasks which modern 
regulators continue to perform indefinitely once competitive markets are achieved.  This does not mean, 
however, that regulators themselves must perform all administrative and management functions.  Rather, 
those are often delegated to independent third parties (such as industry consortia).66  This is also how the 
E.164 country code +1 is administered.67  Local number portability (LNP) is yet another justification 
for such control.  As Andeen & King have remarked, [t]here are many areas of uncertainty regarding the 
future of communications competition, but few are so fundamental in origin or far-reaching in implication 
as the rudimentary issue of addressing.68  It is so fundamental that it is positively required in the 
countries which have signed on to the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and endorsed its 
associated Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles69 (these countries together represent most of the 
world by traffic volume). 
These basic public policy considerations (and arguably the Reference Paper itself), when 
added to the technical considerations discussed above, suggest that ENUM Tier 0 zone should be 
administered in an objective, timely, transparent, and non-discriminatory manner.  The dot at the far 
right of Internet domain names and email addresses, and the underlying IP address space itself, are both 
invisible to Internet users, but essential to Internet operation.  For the exact same reasons as in traditional 
telecommunications and ENUM, Internet naming, numbering, and addressing resources should be 
administered in an objective, timely, transparent, and non-discriminatory manner  at the international 
level, since they are inherently international in scope. 
                                                 
65 See 47 U.S.C. §1001, et seq.  For background resources, see U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
CALEA Implementation Section, Ask CALEA Website (undated), <http://www.askcalea.net/> and FCC, Third Report and 
Order, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, CC Docket 97-213 (released 31 August 1999), at para. 55. 
66 See notes 37 and 38 above, regarding telephone numbering administration and management in New Zealand and Canada, 
respectively. 
67 See note 21 above. 
68 Note 27 above, at 251. 
69 WTO Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles (24 April 1996), 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/servte_e/tel23_e.htm>.  Section 6, Allocation of Scarce Resources, reads (in part): Any 
procedures for the allocation and use of scarce resources, including frequencies, numbers and rights of way, will be carried out in 
an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. 
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(c) ICANN 
ICANN, for its part, appears to be aware of the important international policy role which 
it performs in the Internet Tier 0 environment.  Its articles of incorporation say that:70 
in recognition of the fact that the Internet is an international network of networks, 
owned by no single nation, individual or organization, the Corporation shall [] pursue 
the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting 
the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet 
While the references to charitable and public purposes and lessening the burdens of government have 
more to do with U.S. tax law than lofty principles, the reference to the global public interest is 
powerful.  ICANNs current president acknowledges this important duty in the most emphatic terms:71 
In linking the formation of ICANN to the global Internet community, the White Paper 
established a public trust that required that the DNS be administered in the public interest 
as the unique-rooted, authoritative database for domain names that provides a stable 
addressing system for use by the global Internet community. This commitment to a 
unique and authoritative root is a key part of the broader public trust  to carry out the 
Internet's central coordination functions for the public good  that is ICANN's reason for 
existence. 
Yet even though it might appear that ICANN would have policy authority over whatever TLD is chosen 
for the ENUM root zone, it appears to either defer to the IAB on such matters, or to consider itself bound 
by an IETF-ICANN agreement72 to treat all ENUM-related issues as technical issues, thus putting them in 
the IAB and IETFs bailiwick.  The boundaries of the relationship between the IETF and ICANN are still 
being sorted out.  The process that resulted in the creation of ICANN was driven primarily by the need to 
first institutionalize the DNS, and then add new gTLDs to it.  The technical community was generally 
unmoved by these issues, and many in it viewed the desire by a few to mimic NSIs money-making 
machine as fundamentally un-Internet-like.  These individuals, often very influential in the Internet 
technical community, tried to ignore ICANN as much as possible. 
It is somewhat puzzling that this community seems to wield so much more power than 
ICANN over the ENUM issue, which seems at least as policy-oriented as technical.  Indeed, the issue of 
authority over top-level domains would seem to be squarely within ICANNs area of expertise, as it has 
spent the past three years painstakingly creating a structure of contracts binding registries and registrars in 
several of the other TLDs (including some of the ccTLDs, or country-code TLDs).  Yet as this news story 
explains, ICANN has stayed out of ENUM so far:73 
Additionally, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a 
nonprofit organization operating since 1998 by contract with the government, has some 
                                                 
70 Section 3, Articles Of Incorporation Of Internet Corporation For Assigned Names And Numbers (As Revised November 21, 
1998), <http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm>. 
71 Note 26 above (reference omitted and emphasis added). 
72 RFC 2860, B. Carpenter, IAB; F. Baker, IETF; M. Roberts, ICANN, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the 
Technical Work of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (June 2000), <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2860.txt>. 
73 A.E. Cha, "Enum" Competition Pits Phone Industry Against Internet Start-Ups Washtech.com (April 21, 2001), 
<http://www.washtech.com/news/netarch/9211-1.html>. 
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jurisdiction over the Internet's addressing system. It has so far declined to get involved, 
turning down proposals from private companies to set up their own systems under the 
".tel" or ".num" domains. Given that the plan sits at the intersection of the telephone and 
the Internet realms, it presents a tricky policy issue for the United States. 
For its part, based on public consultation, the French numbering authority appears unwilling to enter into 
any ENUM-related agreements with ICANN, preferring to see the ITU hold whatever power ICANN 
might ordinarily hold over an ENUM TLD:74 
At the international level, a majority of contributions consider it desirable for the [ITU] to 
coordinate implementation of ENUM and to handle administration of the reference 
domain (Tier 0). The ICANN is considered to be an organization that is too young, too 
fragile, with no regulatory power, and too dependent on a single government to handle 
this coordination. The ITU, an entity that grows out of the United Nations organization, 
enjoys the benefit of years of experience with the rules for managing the international 
numbering system and can be a guarantor of neutrality. In this capacity, the ITU appears 
to be the best guarantor of consistency between E.164 numbers and ENUM domain 
names. Technical management of the domain could be handled by the organization 
designated by the ITU in concert with the ICANN. 
Andrew McLaughlin, chief policy officer of ICANN, has been quoted as saying:75 
This is an area where over-regulation would be a tragedy.  A lot of people look to 
ICANN to be an authority in this area, but we restrict our role very strongly. ENUM is 
not part of our mandate. [] 
If there isn't a balanced, fair, and open way of doing things, people won't use it and 
companies won't rely on it Either ENUM is globally available to all users on equal 
terms or it's useless. 
This statement would appear to suggest a surprising change of policy.  Public Internet identifiers have 
always been subject to public oversight, varying from minimal (in the Postel era) to extensive (in the 
ICANN era), by the U.S. government.  Indeed, if it were not for the DoCs heavy-handed intervention in 
the creation of ICANN, it is entirely possible that the DNS would now be essentially under the control of 
VeriSign/NSI.  NSI fought tooth and nail the end of its registry and registrar monopolies, and due to the 
tremendously important role which it continues to play in the day-to-day operation of the Internet, it still 
enjoys prodigious bargaining power with the DoC.  ICANNs then-chairperson Esther Dyson gave this 
evaluation of NSIs degree of cooperation during ICANNs early days:76 
Given this history, and the wealth that has been created through its administration of 
those government contracts, NSI is in no hurry to see that monopoly eroded. Since this 
very goal is a principal short-run objective of ICANN, NSI has apparently concluded that 
its interests are not consistent with ICANNs success. Thus it has been funding and 
otherwise encouraging a variety of individuals and entities to throw sand in the gears 
whenever possible, from as many directions as possible. 
                                                 
74 France, Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications (ART), Principles and Conditions for Implementation of an ENUM 
Protocol in France  Abstract of Contributions to the Public Consultation (English version) (July 2000), <http://www.art-
telecom.fr/publications/synthese-enum-ang.htm>. 
75 In B. Michael, The Politics of Naming Communications Convergence (7 August 2001), 
<http://www.cconvergence.com/article/CTM20010710S0001>. 
76 ICANN, Esther Dysons Response to Questions, letter from E. Dyson to R. Nader and J. Love, Consumer Project on 
Technology (15 June 1999), <http://www.icann.org/chairman-response.htm>. 
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This is precisely the type of behaviour which economists expect from monopolies and dominant operators 
in network industries.  To counteract it, either after the fact or from the outset, most liberalized nations 
enact rules to ensure that public communications networking identifiers are globally available to all users 
on equal terms (to use McLaughlins words).  That justification may also lead them to impose similar 
rules on ENUM, and the exact same considerations should be brought to bear with respect to Internet IP 
addresses and domain names. 
An excellent 2000 article by Michael Froomkin lays to rest a number of myths about 
ICANN.77  Froomkin demonstrates persuasively that: (i) ICANN is a creature of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (DoC), not a self-organizing emanation of the Internet community; (ii) ICANN is engaged in 
broad policy-making, not narrow technical coordination; (iii) ICANN is the regulator of the DNS and IP 
address space; (iv) most ICANN policy decisions are subject to the approval of the DoC; (v) the DoC has 
not given up any of its authority over the root zone, but rather only delegated limited administrative 
authority to ICANN, and (vi) the manner of that delegation likely violates one or both of U.S. 
administrative and constitutional law.  He observes that: [p]inning down the exact nature of DoCs 
relationship with ICANN is difficult, perhaps because a studied ambiguity on a few key points serves the 
interests of both parties.78  This compared to the Internet technical community, where comparative legal 
documentation does not even exist!  The following passage is Froomkins most relevant for present 
purposes:79 
whichever characterization of the government's legal interest prevails, there is no dispute 
that the U.S. government, through the Department of Commerce, currently enjoys de 
facto control of the DNS. Nor is there any dispute that DoC has at least temporarily ceded 
to ICANN, through a variety of contractual and quasi-contractual agreements, almost all 
the control the United States enjoys. DoC has, however, explicitly reserved a right of 
review, the power to create new top-level domains, and the contractual right to replace 
ICANN with another body or take over DNS management directly. 
The U.S. government has thus retained residual policy authority over the IP address space and DNS.  
This paper makes no comment about the manner of ICANNs performance of its delegated authority, but 
rather queries the proper locus of this residual policy authority, given the treatment of similar issues in the 
telecommunications and (possibly) ENUM worlds.  If DoCs delegation of limited policy authority was 
indeed illegal under U.S. law, as Froomkin argues, then ARTs characterization of ICANN as fragile 
would be quite accurate.80 
The concern for many countries, of course, is that one country is effectively in control of 
a global network, even though significant authority has been delegated to an ostensibly international, 
                                                 
77 M. Froomkin, Wrong Turn In Cyberspace: Using ICANN To Route Around The APA And The Constitution (2000) 50 Duke 
L.J. 17, <http://personal.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/icann.pdf>. 
78 Ibid., at 93. 
79 Ibid., at 166. 
80 Note 74 above. 
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bottom-up, private-sector body.81   As Froomkin observes: DoC cannot quasi-privatize the DNS in a 
manner that allows the United States to retain ultimate control of the root zone file but achieve deniability 
about everything that its agent or delegate does with day-to-day control.82  The desire to retain this 
control is certainly understandable, and even has precedent.  As noted above, the nations sharing World 
Zone 1 have agreed to delegate certain administrative authority over it to the NANC, which in turn 
instructs the NANPA on its management.  The NANC remains subject to the residual policy authority of 
the numbering plan administrators of member countries.  Those countries, in turn, allocate administrative 
authority and management responsibilities for Numbering Plan Areas (NPAs, commonly known as area 
codes) within their territories.  The important difference, of course, is that World Zone 1 is a regional 
resource, with joint regional governance.  The DNS and IP address space, by contrast, are fundamentally 
international resources, as ICANN itself acknowledges. 
(d) The White Paper 
The DoC process which culminated in the creation of ICANN was imposed in place of an 
ongoing, Internet community-based project which aimed to institutionalize the IANA function on an 
international footing.  The International Ad Hoc Committees83 (IAHC) Final Report was animated by 
these basic principles:84 
The Internet top level domain space is a public resource and is subject to the public trust. 
Therefore any administration, use and/or evolution of the Internet TLD space is a public 
policy issue and should be carried out in an open and public manner in the interests and 
service of the public. Appropriately, related public policy needs to openly balance and 
represent the interests of the current and future stakeholders in the Internet name space. 
For several reasons which are not relevant for present purposes,85 the DoC unilaterally nullified the IAHC 
effort and declared in January 1998 in the Green Paper86 that it would begin a rulemaking procedure to 
accomplish the corporatization and privatization of the IANA functions, according to the instructions of 
the White House in its Framework for Global Electronic Commerce87 (which may go down in history 
as the high water mark of official belief in the unsuitability of government for governing).  Not 
surprisingly, since it did not even refer to the IAHC process, the Green Paper was criticized by (mainly) 
                                                 
81 Milton Mueller has demonstrated that ICANN, as presently constituted, is none of these things.  See M. Mueller, ICANN and 
Internet Governance: Sorting through the debris of self-regulation. (1999) 1 info 497, 
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84 IAHC, Final Report of the International Ad Hoc Committee: Recommendations for Administration and Management of 
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85 For a good description of these events, see C. Simon, Overview of the DNS Controversy (3 July 2001), 
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86 United States Department of Commerce, A Proposal to Improve Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses: 
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non-American commenters for, among other things: slighting participation by the international 
community, being too US-centric, failing to recognize the need to implement an international approach, 
and interfering in a community consensus.88  Froomkin believes that these comments were taken on board 
by the DoC:89 
The U.S. government's control over the DNS was more accidental than anything else, and 
U.S. officials were receptive to arguments by friendly governments that it was 
unreasonable for the United States to hold such power over a control point that seemed 
likely to be bound into the sinews of every developed economy's commercial, social, 
political, and even artistic life. 
In response, the next version of the policy statement, the White Paper90 (in which the DoC abandoned the 
idea of a proper rulemaking and punted the most difficult issues to a private corporation to be named 
later) explicitly acknowledged the aims of the IAHC process, and the need for the proposed corporation to 
take an international approach in its work:91 
The U.S. Government believes that the Internet is a global medium and that its technical 
management should fully reflect the global diversity of Internet users. We recognize the 
need for and fully support mechanisms that would ensure international input into the 
management of the domain name system. In withdrawing the U.S. Government from 
DNS management and promoting the establishment of a new, non-governmental entity to 
manage Internet names and addresses, a key U.S. Government objective has been to 
ensure that the increasingly global Internet user community has a voice in decisions 
affecting the Internet's technical management. 
We believe this process has reflected our commitment. Many of the comments on the 
Green Paper were filed by foreign entities, including governments. Our dialogue has been 
open to all Internet users - foreign and domestic, government and private - during this 
process, and we will continue to consult with the international community as we begin to 
implement the transition plan outlined in this paper. 
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, the White Paper also asserted that:92 
the U.S. continues to believe, as do most commenters, that neither national 
governments acting as sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as 
representatives of governments should participate in management of Internet names and 
addresses. 
The White Paper says that, despite best efforts to fix it, the gTLD-MoU process was not 
able to overcome initial criticism of both the plan and the process by which the plan was developed,93 
but soon after gives the real reason for its failure:94 
As a result of the pressure to change DNS management, and in order to facilitate its 
withdrawal from DNS management, the U.S. Government, through the Department of 
Commerce and NTIA [National Telecommunication and Information Administration], 
                                                 
88 Excerpts from the comments of, respectively: America Online, Inc. (U.S.), Melbourne IT (Australia), the European 
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89 Note 77 above, at 167. 
90 See note 2 above. 
91 Ibid. at Section 11. 
92 Ibid. at Section 4. 
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94 Ibid. 
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sought public comment on the direction of U.S. policy with respect to DNS, issuing the 
Green Paper on January 30, 1998. 
Two factors are thus said to have led the DoC to intervene: (i) pressure from some quarters to speed 
reform along, and (ii) the U.S. governments desire to withdraw from DNS management.  In retrospect, 
and notwithstanding the otherwise very high quality of drafting throughout the White Paper, definitions of 
the words withdraw and management would have been helpful.  The White Paper states unequivocally 
that national governments (presumably including the U.S. government) should not participate in 
management of Internet names and addresses.  Yet perhaps the DoC never intended to withdraw from 
DNS administration or policy entirely.  Ironically, of course, it would be three and a half more years 
before even the first instance of the top priority of reform  the addition of new TLDs  would happen. 
(e) International expectations 
The European Union was the most insistent on the international governance issue from 
the beginning.  Its expectation, and that of other countries as well, of the U.S. governments complete 
withdrawal, has not been met.  Rather, as a July 2000 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) reveals, the DoC has no current plans to transfer policy authority for the authoritative root server 
to ICANN, and therefore it has not developed a scenario or set of circumstances under which such control 
would be transferred.95  Indeed, just the opposite has happened since then.  Instead of being required to 
divest itself of either its registry or registrar business by May 10, 2001,96 after a long and heated 
negotiation, NSI was allowed to maintain both businesses, under certain conditions, and continue in its 
role as registrar of the only commercially significant TLD, .com, until November 10, 2007.97 
In its July 1998 response to the White Paper, the European Commission appeared to 
accept that U.S.-based private sector management of Internet names and addresses was inevitable, but 
affirmed its belief in the importance of multilateral and intergovernmental arrangements:98 
It would consequently be appropriate for the EU to participate fully in encouraging the 
appropriate multilateral environment for the coordination of international policies in this 
area, including the necessary contribution of the international organisations. The 
international community can and should provide an appropriate political and legal 
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framework for the future management of the Internet by the proposed private industry 
self-regulatory body, in the interests of its own stability. 
The US Government has also recognised that the Internet now has a major international 
dimension, an important step forward, which the EU can endorse and encourage. Such a 
realisation has not come lightly in certain US circles which still identify the Internet with 
US R&D programmes and US-based organisations. 
The US White Paper has the merit of recognising that an US-centric approach is 
increasingly out-dated. Accordingly, there is now an opportunity for European and other 
international interests to take up the challenge to participate fully in the next phase of 
Internet development. 
The opportunities for that participation have principally taken two forms.  First, individual members of 
ICANNs board of directors might happen to be Europeans.99  Second, the EU and European countries 
can participate voluntarily in ICANNs officially powerless Governmental Advisory Committee 
(GAC),100 a body whose genesis is remarkably unclear considering the stance in the White Paper against 
the participation of national governments and intergovernmental organizations.101  The government 
officials who attend GAC meetings clearly participate as representatives of sovereigns because they are 
sent there by them.  Yet it must be an uneasy role, since the White Paper explicitly proscribes national 
governments from participating in management of Internet names and addresses.  As the myth of the 
Internet as ungovernable and even inherently resistant to law continues to wear away (and with it the 
political stigma of asserting the public interest in the Internet environment), national governments 
interest in participating in Internet governance can be expected to increase.  Whether the GAC provides 
them with an adequate forum to participate remains to be seen. 
While not complaining too loudly about any one thing in particular, the European 
Commission has continually reaffirmed its expectation that the U.S. government withdraw completely 
from Internet governance.  In an April 2000 report, the Commission notes:102 
The broad scope of the powers and authorities reasserted by the US Administration (as 
recently as November 1999) notwithstanding, the US Department of Commerce has 
repeatedly reassured the Commission that it is still their intention to withdraw from the 
control of these Internet infrastructure functions and complete the transfer to ICANN by 
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October 2000.  The Commission has confirmed to the US authorities that these remaining 
powers retained by the United States DoC regarding ICANN should be effectively 
divested, as foreseen in the US White Paper. The necessary governmental oversight of 
ICANN should be exercised on a multilateral basis, in the first instance through the 
Governmental Advisory Committee. 
In a September 2000 resolution in response to this report, the Council noted (in part) that:103 
a number of important issues currently remain unresolved, in particular:  
(a) the nature of, and arrangements for, balanced and equal oversight of some of 
ICANN's activities by public authorities; 
[] 
(e) the transfer of the management of the root server system from the US Department 
of Commerce to ICANN, under appropriate international supervision by public 
authorities; [and noted] 
that those issues need to be addressed with due regard for both the interests of the 
international community as a whole and the public policy challenges involved, 
particularly as regards competition, personal data protection and respect for intellectual 
property rights; [] 
The parallels between these issue sets and those implicated by ENUM are obvious.  When the European 
Parliament responded to the Commissions April 2000 report, the Europeans dismay and frustration with 
the lack of a truly international Internet governance solution was apparent.  In the resolution, the 
Parliament says that (among other things) it:104 
insists that neither the Commission, nor the US Government, nor other governments 
should interfere in the organisation and management of the Internet, but they should give 
it sufficient independence and a legal basis at [the] international level, so that it may be 
an independent network [and] 
[c]onsiders it necessary to guarantee the independence of ICANN from the US 
Government and to define the legal framework to which it must adhere in future, on the 
understanding that it is of paramount importance to maintain international neutrality if 
ICANN is to play a key role in the global development of the information society; [] 
For its part, Canada, too, had high expectations for divestiture in the ICANN-forming period of 1998:105 
From the perspective of the Government of Canada, one of the most important goals of 
the reform process continues to be creation of a DNS coordinating body, the "new 
corporation," that will at a minimum be truly accountable and representative. It is clearly 
not enough for the U.S. government to ensure merely that it has "privatized" the DNS -- 
i.e. divested U.S. government agencies of control of DNS functions and placed control in 
the hands of a "private sector" group. The White Paper itself set a higher standard than 
this, and such bare-bones privatization will certainly not meet the needs of most end-user 
groups or of the international community. 
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In late 1998, those countries which had expressed interest in helping to reform the 
management of Internet names and addresses106 accepted the rather unorthodox idea of a California non-
profit corporation managing most of the global public Internets logical infrastructure.  They so agreed in 
part because of the memes prevalent at the time that the Internet was uncontrollable and that government 
was incapable of addressing the public policy issues which it presented, but also because they were led to 
believe that private-sector management by the new corporation would eventually evolve into complete 
administration (i.e., policy authority), within  at the most  two years (a stabilizing transitional period).  
Instead, the U.S. government has retained so much residual policy authority over ICANN that Michael 
Froomkin concludes that:107 
as ICANN is utterly dependent on DoC for ICANN's continuing authority, funding, and, 
indeed, its reason for being, it would be reasonable to conclude that the corporation is 
currently so captive that all of ICANN's decisions can fairly be charged to the 
government. 
Either a number of countries have seriously misinterpreted the White Paper for over three years, or the 
U.S. government has failed to meet their expectations for its complete withdrawal.108  As Froomkin 
observed in late 2000, regarding the most basic questions of how to design a globally-effective 
governance structure for the Internet: [m]ost of these problems are if anything more real, and more 
pressing, today.109 
6. Unifying International Telecommunications Networks and Governance 
In their excellent 1997 chapter on public network addressing and competition, Andeen & 
King speculate on the intertwined futures of the traditional telecommunications world and the Internet:110 
one could argue that in the technical, administrative, and governance dimensions the 
Internet will absorb and subordinate the telephone world. As intriguing as this 
speculation might be, it is highly improbable that the Internet could subsume, much less 
handle, anything near the scale of the existing telephony infrastructure, particularly since 
that infrastructure carries most of the Internets traffic.  Nevertheless, this development 
suggests why the continuing blending of telephone and Internet form and functionality 
calls for a more penetrating assessment of the challenges of communications under 
competition.  A focus on addressing provides a special window into the technical and 
socio-institutional problems at the heart of this transition. 
This paper has attempted to provide an assessment of the challenges of pro-competitive 
telecommunications and Internet policy in the context of an emerging technology which in effect bridges 
the two.  Ultimately, it should not matter whether ENUM is thought of as a telecommunications issue or 
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an Internet issue because they engage the exact same global public interests.  It is only due to historical 
reasons that they are presently subject to different governance patterns. 
For the purposes of Internet legal and policy analysis, it is essential to distinguish the 
features and contingencies of the Internets logical infrastructure layer from those of its physical, 
application, and content/transaction layers.  Very different conditions and considerations prevail at each 
layer, and consequently legal arguments and policy approaches have to be tailored accordingly.  In the 
logical layer, there is a technical need for uniqueness in naming, numbering, and addressing (among other 
things).  This unavoidably creates a situation in which someone holds a certain degree of control over 
them.  As Weinberg explains, prior to ICANN, this control was always exercised in a public-regarding 
manner:111 
ICANN's task in seeking public acceptance of its legitimacy was made more complicated 
by the fact that it was a private entity seeking to play the sort of role more commonly 
played in our society by public entities. Its self-assigned task, after all, was one of setting 
rules for an international communications medium of surpassing importance. The task, 
administration of Internet identifiers, had historically been performed at the behest of the 
U.S. government and had been conducted in an explicitly public-regarding manner. 
Although ICANNs current president acknowledges ICANNs obligation to continue this tradition for the 
benefit of Internet participants worldwide, residual policy authority over these resources continues to be 
held by the U.S. government.  The U.S. has apparently created and then dashed expectations among other 
nations that it is committed to putting the governance of these resources onto a completely independent, 
completely international footing. 
The internetworking paradigm is a tremendously powerful one.  An open, accessible, 
non-proprietary global public network which offers universal interconnectivity and interoperability is a 
remarkable thing.  In many ways, the Internet truly does turn previous models of communications 
networking on their heads, putting vastly more power into the hands of users to define services for 
themselves or invent services to offer to the public.  The import of former IAB chair Brian Carpenters 
simple but insightful observation that nobody can turn it off112 cannot be overstated.  In very large 
measure, there is no one standing astride the Internet who can say what anyone can or cannot do with it, 
on it, under it, or even around it (at least not yet  the imperial aspirations of Microsoft and AOL 
notwithstanding).  Naming, numbering, and addressing resources are in fact a relatively narrow exception 
to this pattern  but an inordinately influential exception  which creates, in the words of David Post, an 
Archimedean point on which this vast global network balances.113  Aside from these unavoidable 
restraints, there is almost no other framework or opportunity for top-down control of the Internet, from 
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113 Note 61 above. 
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either a technical or a legal point of view.  To many, this diffusion of power is the Internets defining 
strength. 
Yet it is also the source of some of the public Internets most worrisome weaknesses.  
The Internet communitys struggle to control spam, denial-of-service attacks, and worms illustrates the 
downside of this diffusion of authority.  Aside from downstream contractual obligations, there is currently 
no way to require network administrators to patch security holes in their publicly-accessible servers, and 
so the risks to overall Internet performance, and the costs of fighting these scourges, continue unabated.  
From an economic point of view, the commercial Internet industry continues to try to find a way to make 
sure that everybody gets paid for their contributions to overall interconnectivity (known in the 
telecommunications world as the settlement process).  Indeed, it is well-known that the Internet must be 
improved significantly, at the infrastructure layers, to meet the tremendous expectations which the world 
has for it: to be a ubiquitous industrial-grade, multiservice, multimedia communications platform.  Rob 
Frieden describes this reality well:114 
An Internet-centric environment emphasizes the versatility of the Internet in terms of its 
ability to provide a medium for a wealth of different services and functions.  But the 
Internet as we know it now will have to evolve and diversify, because a uniform, one-
size-fits-all system cannot satisfy all particular user requirements.  The Internet grows in 
importance because more users will resort to Internet-mediation for more services, 
including a variety of commercial applications.  That will require Internet carriers and 
service providers to address and resolve a host of problems (e.g., quality of service, 
responding to consumer requirements, elasticity of demand-based pricing, customer care, 
network reliability, handling peak demand conditions) that perpetually have challenged 
telecommunications carriers. 
Perhaps the most significant infrastructural challenge facing the Internet community 
today is the need to upgrade the Internets basic protocol suite to IPv6.115  The standard has been stable 
since at least 1998, yet for various reasons, it has not been widely implemented yet, despite the 
exhortations of ISOC.  It so far appears that there is little interest in the Internet community (at least in 
North America) in making the required investment.116  While it runs counter to Internet mythology, there 
was a time when the kind of top-down policy authority which the DoC currently holds over the public 
Internet supported the imposition of such an upgrade.  TCP/IP did not spontaneously become the sole 
basic protocol suite of the ARPANET.  Bob Kahn, the co-inventor of TCP/IP, explains:117 
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The TCP/IP protocol adopted by DOD a few years earlier was only one of many 
standards. Although it was the only one that dealt explicitly with internetworking of 
packet networks, its use was not yet mandated on the ARPANET. However, on January 
1, 1983, TCP/IP became the standard for the ARPANET, replacing the older host 
protocol known as NCP. This step was in preparation for the ARPANET-MILNET split, 
which was to occur about a year later. Mandating the use of TCP/IP on the ARPANET 
encouraged the addition of local area networks and also accelerated the growth in 
numbers of users and networks. 
Kahn understates the phenomenon: standardization on TCP/IP triggered an explosion of interconnection.  
Hafner and Lyon describe the event this way:118 
As milestones go, the transition to TCP/IP was perhaps the most important event that 
would take place in the development of the Internet for years to come. After TCP/IP was 
installed, the network could branch anywhere; the protocols made the transmission of 
data from one network to another a trivial task. 
It is still branching today.  Brian Kahin and Bruce McConnell offer another view of the transition to 
TCP/IP and its significance:119 
A watershed decision during the mid-1980s was NSFs choice of the TCP/IP protocol 
rather than a proprietary protocol or X.25. As Mandelbaum and Mandelbaum observe: 
 It led almost directly to the establishment of the system of specialized private 
academic networks we have today [in 1992], rather than to reliance by the 
academic and research community on the public, commercial networks that are 
the mainstays of the business world. 
Both the design of TCP/IP and its adoption by the pre-commercial Internet community were 
fundamentally non-market phenomena.  The Internets core protocols and standards were initially 
developed for explicitly non-commercial purposes, and were only later adopted by commercial networks 
(many of which evolved directly out of the early regional institutional networks).  This fundamental 
tension underlies many of the other challenges facing the Internets infrastructure today, such as quality of 
service and security.  IPv6 is expected to help both causes, but there is no agency which can mandate its 
implementation anymore. 
Of course, there is no such agency in the telecommunications world which could mandate 
a global telephone industry software upgrade either.  National authorities might require Internet operators 
to modify their systems for reasons of public policy, though, with or without the IETFs help (the 
example being CALEA120).  On the subject of quality of service, it is interesting to note that most 
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commercially significant IP telephony traffic travels over private, dedicated IP links  effectively 
bypassing the public Internet as much as possible.121  The foregoing are intended merely to identify the 
kinds of challenges which the Internet faces, and the limitations which the diffusion of authority over it 
imposes.  As the Internet continues to evolve, it will be important for legal (and other) scholars to track 
the fate of the fundamental design principles that have made the Internet an open, accessible, non-
proprietary global public network, offering universal interconnectivity and interoperability.122  As Lessig 
has shown, there is nothing in its nature which ensures that it will always bear these remarkable 
characteristics.  Rather, the economic characteristics of networks (e.g., network effects) and the ruthlessly 
binary nature of computer networks (youre either in or youre out, on or off) combine to make the 
question of who controls the Internets code that much more important. 
As in traditional telecommunications, and even the Internet itself, public oversight is 
necessary for those narrow (but incalculably important) aspects of ENUM relating to naming, numbering, 
and addressing.  A single, coordinated global DNS domain for ENUM is called for at the Tier 0 level.  
Regardless of which TLD is ultimately chosen to host it, and how administrative and policy authority are 
divided up, the latter should reside at the international level.  While this paper has not addressed Tier 1 
issues as such, similar considerations likely call for a similar approach at the domestic level.  However, 
that decision is up to each individual country.  By contrast, since the Internets logical infrastructure is 
inherently international, the kinds of public policy issues which arise at ENUM Tiers 0 and 1 arise in the 
Internets own Tier 0  the DNS root zone and IP address space.  These issues should be thought of as 
matters of international public policy and dealt with in an objective, timely, transparent, and non-
discriminatory manner at the international level.  The existing pattern of Internet governance, and in 
particular the U.S. governments continuing residual policy authority over the DNS and IP address space, 
is not the outcome that many countries expected from the White Paper process.  Internet governance is 
not yet truly international. 
Private networks, to which the public does not ordinarily have access, do not raise such 
public policy issues, for obvious reasons.  However, and contrary to the assertions of some,123 there is 
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very little that is private about the Internets logical infrastructure.124  Indeed, the Internet may be the 
ultimate public network.125  At its physical layer, Internet-connected computers and telecommunications 
facilities are generally privately-owned and controlled (although the latter are often subject to public 
oversight where service is offered to the public).  At the application and content/transaction layers, there 
are practically no limits (other than those of generally-applicable laws) on the autonomous private action 
of Internet participants.  At the all-important logical infrastructure layer (which links them all together), 
however, things are very different.  The need for neutral, authoritative, international public oversight of 
shared elements of the Internets logical infrastructure is succinctly described by Mark Lemley in the 
following statement, which serves well as a closing thought:126 
If the optimal number of Internets is indeed one, governance of the system itself must in 
the final analysis be effective at the global level. 
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